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YOU DON’T HAVE TO, BUT IT’S IN YOUR BEST 
INTEREST: REQUIRING EXPRESS IDEOLOGICAL 




Congress enjoys broad authority to enact laws and regulations by 
which the citizens of the United States must abide.1 Certain uses of 
that authority, however, are impermissible.2 Any legislation 
promulgated by the government must not exceed the limits created by 
the Constitution.3 The Constitution forbids Congress from directly 
exercising its legislative power to achieve certain goals.4 For 
example, Congress cannot directly remove a state official from office 
for engaging in political activity5 or ban an organization from 
speaking out about abortion.6 Through use of the spending power7 
                                                                                                                                         
 *  J.D. Candidate, 2013, Georgia State University College of Law. Thank you to Patrick Wiseman 
and everyone involved with the Georgia State University Law Review for your valuable feedback and 
suggestions. 
 1. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 111 (2006) (prohibiting the assault of a United States government employee); 
id. § 242 (prohibiting the deprivation of constitutionally protected rights because of a person’s color or 
race); id. § 157 (prohibiting bankruptcy fraud). 
 2. E.g., id. § 922(2)(A) (1994) (federal statute prohibiting the possession of firearms in a school 
zone found unconstitutional in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568 (1995)); id. § 2256(8)(B) 
(2000) (statute that criminalized the distribution of what appeared to be, but was not, child pornography 
held unconstitutional in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 256 (2002)); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 13981 (2000) (statute creating a federal civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence held 
unconstitutional in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000)). 
 3. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 508 (1999). The Court stated: 
Article I of the Constitution grants Congress broad power to legislate in certain areas. 
Those legislative powers are, however, limited not only by the scope of the Framers’ 
affirmative delegation, but also by the principle “that they may not be exercised in a way 
that violates other specific provisions of the Constitution.” 
Id. (citing Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968)). 
 4. U.S. CONST. amend I. (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of 
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”). 
 5. Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947) (“[T]he United States . . . has 
no power to regulate local political activities as such of state officials . . . .”). 
 6. See U.S. CONST. amend I. 
 7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, 
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the 
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and government subsidies, however, Congress can indirectly achieve 
legislative goals it would not otherwise be able to achieve.8 Although 
the government cannot simply prohibit an organization from 
lobbying,9 the government can provide subsidies to organizations that 
refrain from doing so.10 When exercising its spending power, the 
constitutional limitations on Congress “are less exacting than those 
on its authority to regulate directly.”11 
One of the most common methods of indirectly promoting 
legislative goals is to provide federal funding on the condition that 
the recipient must adhere to certain regulatory guidelines.12 For 
example, if the government believes abortion to be an unacceptable 
method of family planning, the government can provide funding to 
those organizations who agree not to use the funding to promote 
abortion.13 This practice is generally a permissible use of the 
                                                                                                                                         
United States . . . .”). 
 8. For example, in South Dakota v. Dole, South Dakota challenged the constitutionality of 23 
U.S.C. § 158, which directed the Secretary of Transportation to withhold federal highway funds from 
states that did not have a minimum drinking age of twenty-one. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 
205 (1987). The Court did not expressly state that Congress would be acting outside its authority by 
directly requiring a minimum drinking age of twenty-one but stated that, even if that were the case, 
“objectives not thought to be within Article I’s ‘enumerated legislative fields’ may nevertheless be 
attained through the use of the spending power and the conditional grant of federal funds.” Id. at 207 
(internal citation omitted). 
 9. The right to petition the government is protected under the First Amendment and cannot be 
infringed. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 10. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) provides tax-exempt status to charitable and other organizations that do 
not engage in lobbying. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). The Supreme Court upheld § 501(c)(3) as 
constitutional in Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington on the grounds that the 
government, if it so desires, can choose not to subsidize lobbying and that such a refusal does not violate 
the First Amendment. Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983). 
Although Regan deals with a tax issue rather than an actual government outlay, the Court conflated the 
taxing and spending powers and analyzed the tax exemption as if it were a “cash grant.” Id. at 544. The 
Court stated “tax exemptions and tax-deductibility are a form of subsidy that is administered through the 
tax system.” Id. “A tax exemption has much the same effect as a cash grant to the organization of the 
amount of tax it would have to pay on its income.” Id. For the purposes of this Note, tax exemptions, as 
they were in Regan, are treated as subsidies. 
 11. South Dakota, 483 U.S. at 209. This proposition apparently applies to the taxing power as well. 
See Regan, 461 U.S. at 544. Although Congress could never prohibit an organization from lobbying 
outright, it can offer tax exemptions to those organizations that refrain from doing so. Id. at 551. 
 12. E.g., United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (conditioning receipt of federal 
funds on libraries adopting internet filters); South Dakota, 483 U.S. at 203 (conditioning receipt of 
federal highway funds on a state’s adoption of a minimum drinking age); Regan, 461 U.S. at 540 
(conditioning receipt of a tax exemption on recipient refraining from lobbying). 
 13. Title X of the Public Health Service Act was enacted to provide funding for prenatal family 
planning services. 42 U.S.C. § 300(a). None of the funds appropriated under the Act, however, could be 
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spending power.14 Not all funding conditions, however, are 
constitutionally acceptable.15 Congress cannot, for example, “place a 
condition on the receipt of a benefit or subsidy that infringes upon [a] 
recipient’s constitutionally protected rights.”16 
Among the rights a funding condition cannot infringe upon is, of 
course, the First Amendment right to engage in constitutionally 
protected speech.17 Although this limitation on conditions seems 
elementary on the surface, courts and legal professionals alike have 
had a difficult time determining when, if ever, a condition on the 
receipt of funds actually infringes a constitutional right.18 Recent 
legislation has further contributed to the confusion by presenting 
funding conditions not yet seen by the Supreme Court—conditions 
that require organizations to espouse a particular viewpoint on a 
controversial issue as a prerequisite to receiving funds.19 
The United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, 
and Malaria Act of 2003 (Leadership Act)20 requires a non-
                                                                                                                                         
used by programs where abortion was considered a method of family planning. Id. at § 300(a)(6). The 
constitutionality of this provision was challenged and upheld in Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
 14. E.g., Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 214; Rust, 500 U.S. at 203; South Dakota, 483 U.S. at 212. 
 15. E.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012) (finding 
unconstitutional a provision of the Affordable Care Act that conditioned states’ receipt of all Medicaid 
expenses on their expansion of Medicaid coverage); Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 549 
(2001) (invalidating a funding condition that prohibited lawyers who received funds under the Act from 
challenging existing welfare statutes); FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 402 
(1984) (declaring unconstitutional a regulation that conditioned the receipt of federal funds on a 
broadcast station refraining from editorializing). 
 16. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 651 F.3d 218, 231 (2d Cir. 
2011) (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)). This limitation is known as the doctrine 
of “unconstitutional conditions.” Id. 
 17. In Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, the Supreme Court reviewed the 
constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment, which required law schools as a condition of receiving 
federal funds, to allow military recruiters the same access to campus as non-military recruiters. 
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 51 (2006). The Supreme 
Court reiterated its previous statements that a funding condition cannot infringe the right to free speech 
but held that the Solomon Amendment did not actually regulate speech. Id. at 59–60. Consequently, the 
Court did not feel the need to conduct a First Amendment analysis. Id. at 70. 
 18. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (1989) 
(explaining that there is confusion regarding the application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (with Particular 
Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593, 594 (1990) (“The various puzzles 
produced by the [unconstitutional conditions] doctrine have created considerable doctrinal confusion 
and provoked a wide range of commentary.”). 
 19. 22 U.S.C. § 7631(f) (2006). 
 20. Id. §§ 7601–82. 
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governmental organization (NGO), as a condition of receiving 
funds,21 to adopt a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex 
trafficking (“policy requirement”).22 On two occasions, NGOs have 
challenged the policy requirement claiming that it violated their First 
Amendment rights.23 In DKT International v. USAID (DKT), the 
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld the policy 
requirement as a permissible condition on federal funding.24 In 
contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
Alliance for Open Society International v. USAID (Alliance) struck 
down the condition as an unconstitutional violation of free speech 
rights.25 
This Note analyzes the constitutionality of the Leadership Act’s 
policy requirement and proposes factors to consider in determining 
the constitutionality of a funding condition requiring an organization 
to affirmatively express a particular viewpoint on an issue. Part I 
discusses Congress’s use of funding conditions and provides a brief 
                                                                                                                                         
 21. The Act provides funding to organizations to, among other things, provide medical care to those 
infected with HIV/AIDS, to educate populations on HIV/AIDS prevention, and to test individuals for 
the disease. Id. § 7611(a)(4)(C)–(E). 
 22. Id. § 7631(f) (“No funds made available to carry out this chapter, or any amendment made by 
this chapter, may be used to provide assistance to any group or organization that does not have a policy 
explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking . . . .”). 
 23. See generally Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 651 F.3d 218, 
225 (2d Cir. 2011); DKT Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 477 F.3d 758, 761 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 24. DKT International is an organization that provides family planning and HIV/AIDS prevention 
programming in foreign countries. DKT, 477 F.3d at 760. DKT receives roughly 16% of its budget from 
Agency grants. Id. In Vietnam, DKT operates as a subgrantee under Family Health International (FHI) 
where it distributes condoms and lubricant. Id. The distribution of condoms is to encourage safe sex. Id. 
In 2005, FHI provided DKT with an agreement to run an Agency-funded lubricant distribution program. 
Id. The agreement included a certification that DKT explicitly opposed prostitution. Id. DKT refused to 
sign the agreement with the certification requirement, and FHI informed DKT that it would be unable to 
provide additional funding to DKT. Id. at 760–61. DKT claimed that requiring an organization to 
explicitly oppose prostitution violates First Amendment rights. Id. at 761. The D.C. Circuit rejected 
DKT’s claim and upheld the condition. Id. at 764. 
 25. Alliance for Open Society International (AOSI) and Pathfinder are two organizations involved in 
the international fight against HIV/AIDS. Alliance, 651 F.3d at 224. AOSI runs a program in Central 
Asia that aims to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS by reducing injection drug use. Id. Pathfinder 
provides family planning and reproductive health services in more than twenty countries. Id. Both 
receive funding from sources other than the USAID, and neither actively supports prostitution. Id. Both 
groups’ work, however, includes educating and assisting prostitutes, as well as advocating strategies for 
fighting AIDS among prostitutes at policy conferences. Id. In 2005, both organizations adopted policy 
statements stating their opposition to prostitution in order to remain eligible to receive funds. Id. The 
organizations then initiated suit on the grounds that the policy requirement was a violation of the First 
Amendment. Id. at 225. The Second Circuit struck down the condition as unconstitutional. Id. at 239. 
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background of the constitutional doctrines that have provided the 
basis for the Supreme Court’s decisions as to the constitutionality of 
funding conditions.26 Part II evaluates the current tests and standards 
employed by the Supreme Court in considering the constitutionality 
of funding conditions.27 Part III proposes that the constitutionality of 
a condition—such as the one imposed by the Leadership Act—
should depend on: (1) whether a particular viewpoint is being 
espoused; and (2) whether the public is aware that the statement is 
required by the government.28 If the organization is required to 
espouse the government’s particular viewpoint and if there is no way 
to discern that the organization is simply adhering to a governmental 
regulation, strict scrutiny should apply.29 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE OF FUNDING CONDITIONS 
Congress and state legislatures alike have often used subsidies as a 
means of indirectly promoting government policy.30 Conditioning 
funding on compliance with regulatory guidelines is a common 
method of achieving legislative goals.31 Occasionally, however, 
certain conditions cross the line into unconstitutionality.32 In Speiser 
v. Randall, for example, the Supreme Court found that a tax 
exemption conditioned33 on a potential recipient agreeing not to 
                                                                                                                                         
 26. See discussion infra Part I. 
 27. See discussion infra Part II. 
 28. See discussion infra Part III. 
 29. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 30. E.g., 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2006) (encouraging the adoption of a minimum drinking age of twenty-
one by permitting the withholding of federal highway funds from states who refused to adopt the 
minimum, upheld in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987)); 42 U.S.C. § 666 (requiring states 
who hope to receive federal funds to operate their child support and public assistance programs to meet 
certain goals regarding, among other things, the placement of welfare recipients into work, upheld in 
Kansas v. United States, 24 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1200 (D. Kan. 1998)). 
 31. See generally, e.g., United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003); South Dakota, 483 
U.S. 203; Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983). 
 32. E.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593 (2012); Legal Servs. Corp. v. 
Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 548–49 (2001); FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 402 
(1984). 
 33. In Speiser, the Court reviewed a portion of the California tax code that withheld tax exemptions 
for which military veterans were otherwise eligible unless the veteran signed an oath stating that he did 
not advocate the overthrow of the government. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 514 (1958). 
Admittedly, there are some differences between providing tax exemptions and directly subsidizing 
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advocate the forcible overthrow of the government was an 
unconstitutional infringement of free speech.34 The courts, however, 
have generally experienced difficulty determining when exactly a 
condition crosses the line into unconstitutionality, which has led to 
inconsistency in funding conditions doctrine.35 
When analyzing the constitutionality of a condition on a benefit’s 
receipt, courts often consider, among other factors,36 whether the 
statute or regulation has a coercive effect on the recipient,37 whether 
the regulation is “aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas,”38 and 
whether the expression at issue, in instances where speech is 
implicated, falls under the category of government speech.39 
Members of the Supreme Court often have differing opinions on how 
                                                                                                                                         
certain activity. However, the Supreme Court has stated, “[T]ax exemptions . . . are a form of subsidy 
that is administered through the tax system.” Regan, 461 U.S. at 544. 
 34. Speiser, 357 U.S. at 529. 
 35. Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 
U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1303–04 (1984) (explaining judicial opinions on unconstitutional conditions cases 
as having “manifested an inconsistency”); Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of 
Congressional Delegations of Authority, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 873, 914 (explaining the application of the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine as “wildly inconsistent”). 
 36. When an organization argues that its First Amendment rights have been infringed because a 
condition prohibits funding recipients from engaging in certain expression, courts have considered 
whether other avenues are available that the recipient can use to engage in the proscribed expression. 
E.g., League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 400 (explaining that if the condition prohibiting television 
stations that hoped to receive funding from “editorializ[ing]” allowed organizations to editorialize 
through affiliates, the condition would be constitutional); Regan, 461 U.S. at 544 (stating that although 
an organization could not receive a benefit if it chose to lobby, it could continue to lobby through an 
affiliate organization). 
 37. E.g., Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 237 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(asserting that an Arkansas sales tax scheme that provided a tax exemption to religious, sports, and 
professional journals but not other magazines should be upheld because it has no coercive effect on 
potential recipients); Speiser, 357 U.S. at 519 (striking down a condition that would “have the effect of 
coercing the claimants to refrain from the proscribed speech”); see also Sullivan, supra note 18, at 1429 
(“[T]he degree of scrutiny applied to rights-pressuring conditions has tended to turn on conclusory 
references to coercion or freedom of choice.”). 
 38. E.g., Regan, 461 U.S. at 548–50 (stating that the law in question may have been found 
unconstitutional if the regulation was aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas); Speiser, 357 U.S. at 
519 (declaring unconstitutional a condition because it was “aimed at the suppression of dangerous 
ideas”). 
 39. See, e.g., Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 567 (2005) (upholding a regulation 
that taxed the sale of cattle to pay for advertising campaigns for beef because the advertising qualified as 
government speech and was thus not subject to First Amendment challenges); Legal Servs. Corp. v. 
Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542 (2001) (striking down a condition prohibiting recipients of federal 
funding from challenging welfare statutes partially because the funding program was meant to 
encourage private speech not to relay a governmental message). 
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certain staples of First Amendment doctrine apply in a government 
subsidy context.40 The manner in which these and other 
considerations are applied is often determinative of a regulation’s 
constitutionality.41 If a condition is viewpoint-based or has a coercive 
effect on the recipient, it is more likely to be held unconstitutional.42 
A. Coercive Effect 
The Leadership Act requires funding recipients to adopt a policy 
explicitly opposing prostitution.43 Although the government enjoys 
broad discretion to condition the receipt of its funds, “[t]he 
government may not place a condition on the receipt of a benefit or 
subsidy that infringes upon the recipient’s constitutionally protected 
rights.”44 When a petitioner challenges a condition on free speech 
grounds, the court must determine whether the condition actually 
infringes the right to free speech.45 In analyzing whether a condition 
infringes upon a right, courts have attempted to determine whether a 
condition or regulation is so coercive that it can be equated to a direct 
regulation or law.46 When a coercive effect exists, strict scrutiny47 
                                                                                                                                         
 40. Compare United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 211 (2003) (stating that the 
analyzed condition did not deny a benefit to libraries who chose not to install internet filters on their 
computers), with id. at 226–27 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the condition threatened the denial 
of benefits to libraries that did not install internet filters). Compare Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 
(1991) (stating that the government was not discriminating on the basis of viewpoint by choosing to 
fund family planning methods other than abortion), with id. at 207 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating 
that the majority opinion upheld a viewpoint-based suppression of speech). 
 41. In South Dakota v. Dole, the Supreme Court found that a condition that required recipients of 
federal highway funds to adopt a minimum drinking age of twenty-one was not coercive and was thus 
constitutional. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987). In Rust v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court 
found that a condition that prohibited funding recipients from advocating for abortion was not viewpoint 
discrimination and was thus constitutional. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193. 
 42. E.g., Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 549; Speiser, 357 U.S. at 518. 
 43. 22 U.S.C. § 7631(f) (2006). 
 44. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 651 F.3d 218, 231 (2d Cir. 
2011) (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)). 
 45. “[T]he government ‘may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his 
constitutionally protected interests—especially his interest in freedom of speech.’” FCC v. League of 
Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 408 (1984) (citing Perry, 408 U.S. at 597). 
 46. E.g., Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 237 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
Justice Scalia writes: 
The reason that denial of participation in a tax exemption or other subsidy scheme 
does not necessarily ‘infringe’ a fundamental right is that—unlike direct restriction or 
prohibition—such a denial does not, as a general rule, have any significant coercive 
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often applies,48 frequently to the detriment of the condition or 
regulation.49 Whether a court finds that a statute has a coercive 
effect—and thus infringes a right—often depends on a condition’s 
classification as either a penalty on the exercise of speech rights or a 
mere refusal to subsidize certain expression.50 If a condition is 
characterized as a “penalty,” the regulation or statute likely will be 
found unconstitutional;51 however, if the court determines that a 
condition prohibiting certain speech is simply a refusal to subsidize 
that speech, the condition likely will be upheld.52 Scholars have 
                                                                                                                                         
effect. It may, of course, be manipulated so as to do so, in which case the courts will be 
available to provide relief. 
Id. See also, e.g., Speiser, 357 U.S. at 518 (finding a condition unconstitutional because denial of the tax 
exemption coerced applicants into refraining from expressing disfavored speech); Am. Commc’ns 
Ass’n, C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950) (“Under some circumstances, indirect 
‘discouragements’ undoubtedly have the same coercive effect upon the exercise of First Amendment 
rights as imprisonment, fines, injunctions or taxes.”). 
 47. “Strict Scrutiny” is a “judicially crafted formula for implementing constitutional values.” 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1268–69 (2007). Under strict 
scrutiny, legislation will only be upheld if it is “necessary” or “narrowly tailored” to serve a “compelling 
governmental interest.” Id. at 1269. Very few laws meet the requirements to survive strict scrutiny. J. 
Michael Connolly, Loading the Dice in Direct Democracy: The Constitutionality of Content- and 
Viewpoint-Based Regulations of Ballot Initiatives, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 129, 134 (2008). As a 
result, the strict scrutiny standard has been described as “strict in theory, fatal in fact.” Id. at 135. 
 48. In Clarke v. United States, the District Court applied strict scrutiny to a regulation that 
conditioned a substantial amount of the District of Columbia’s operational funding on the adoption of a 
law that allowed religiously affiliated institutions to deny benefits to persons condoning homosexuality. 
Clarke v. United States, 705 F. Supp. 605, 609 (D.D.C. 1988), vacated as moot, 915 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 
1990). The district court, applying strict scrutiny, found the condition was coercive and infringed 
protected speech. Id. at 609–10; see also Speiser, 357 U.S. at 518, 529 (applying strict scrutiny because 
the regulation coerced speech such that the statute had a similar effect on speech as a direct regulation). 
 49. See supra note 47. 
 50. The courts have drawn a distinction between denying a benefit to someone because he exercises 
his constitutional right (the Speiser condition) and simply not paying for someone to exercise that right 
(Regan). Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983). Scholars have 
argued that the characterization of a condition as a “penalty” or a “nonsubsidy” depends upon the 
baseline from which one measures. E.g., Sullivan, supra note 18, at 1436. Take the Regan condition for 
example, Regan, 461 U.S. at 543–44; if one assumes a baseline of subsidies for all nonprofit 
organizations, then withholding a subsidy from an organization that lobbies would be considered 
“penalizing” that expression. Sullivan, supra note 18, at 1441. However, if one assumes a baseline of no 
subsidies for lobbying activities, then the condition would not act as a penalty on that expression; the 
condition would just be a nonsubsidy. Id. This Note does not focus on the use of baselines but on the 
deterrent effect of conditions regardless of the characterization as a penalty or nonsubsidy. 
 51. Speiser, 357 U.S. at 528 (finding that denial of a tax exemption penalized exercise of free speech 
rights and was thus unconstitutional); Sullivan, supra note 18, at 1420 (stating that conditioned benefits 
labeled “penalties” are usually struck down). 
 52. Regan, 461 U.S. 540 (upholding a funding condition because refusal to subsidize a certain right 
does not infringe that right); Sullivan, supra note 18, at 1420 (stating that conditioned benefits labeled 
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criticized the penalty/nonsubsidy dichotomy as arbitrary, thus leading 
to inconsistent results even when the courts are presented with 
factually analogous scenarios.53 Additionally, scholars have argued 
that constitutional rights can be impermissibly burdened even if not 
necessarily “coerced” through the offer of a benefit.54 Despite these 
criticisms, courts continue to look to a condition’s coercive effect in 
determining its constitutionality. 
B. Viewpoint-Based Regulations 
Congress cannot impose a condition on a benefit’s receipt that acts 
as a coercive penalty on the exercise of free speech rights.55 
Additionally, Congress cannot regulate speech based on the speech’s 
message.56 “It is either as a coercive penalty or as viewpoint 
suppression . . . that the denial of a government benefit may ‘infringe 
[a person’s] constitutionally protected . . . freedom of speech . . . .’”57 
Typically, when the government attempts to regulate or burden 
certain speech specifically because of the speech’s particular message 
or content, strict scrutiny applies.58 However, regulations that confer 
benefits or impose burdens on speech irrespective of its content are 
considered content-neutral and are subject only to intermediate 
scrutiny.59 Application of the normal standards for content-based and 
                                                                                                                                         
“nonsubsidies” are usually upheld). 
 53. See Sullivan, supra note 18, at 1420 (“Conclusory labels often take the place of analysis . . . .”). 
Sullivan also explores the difference in outcomes of two cases—cases dealing with almost identical 
conditions—caused by use of the penalty/nonsubsidy distinction. Id. at 1441–42. 
 54. Id. at 1499 (“[G]overnment can as readily aggrandize excessive power or maldistribute power 
among rightholders through selective subsidization as through conditions that more obviously restrict 
liberty. Cases drawing a distinction between permissible ‘nonsubsidies’ and impermissible ‘penalties’ 
often miss just this point.” (footnote omitted)). 
 55. Speiser, 357 U.S. at 518 (holding unconstitutional a condition that penalized certain speech and 
had the effect of coercing claimants to refrain from proscribed speech). 
 56. Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[A]bove all else, the First Amendment 
means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject 
matter, or its content.”). 
 57. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 651 F.3d 218, 246 (2d Cir. 
2011) (Straub, J., dissenting) (citing Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 
U.S. 47, 59 (2006)). 
 58. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (“Our precedents thus apply the most 
exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech 
because of its content.”). 
 59. Id. 
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content-neutral regulations has varied in the government subsidy 
context.60 Despite the fact that certain funding conditions seemingly 
discriminate on the basis of content or viewpoint, the Court has, in 
certain opinions, neglected to apply strict or intermediate scrutiny.61 
At times, the Court has instead applied minimal scrutiny, reasoning 
that refusing to subsidize one activity while simultaneously funding 
another is simply not discriminating on the basis of viewpoint.62 In 
Speiser, however, the Court chose to apply strict scrutiny.63 The 
Court found that the condition was “aimed at the suppression of 
dangerous ideas” and thus discriminated on the basis of viewpoint.64 
The majority of case law on the conditioning of subsidies indicates 
that when the government selectively funds one activity to the 
exclusion of another, the government is not discriminating on the 
basis of viewpoint; therefore, First Amendment rights are not 
infringed.65 Similarly, courts have held that when the government 
itself is “speaking” through the distribution of its largesse, no First 
Amendment concerns are implicated.66 
                                                                                                                                         
 60. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (finding that when the government chooses 
to fund one activity as opposed to another, the government has not discriminated on the basis of 
viewpoint); Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 548–49 (1983) (finding that 
a restriction prohibiting recipients of a tax exemption from lobbying did not infringe First Amendment 
rights, thus minimal scrutiny was applied). 
 61. For example, the Rust Court failed to apply strict or intermediate scrutiny to a regulation that 
provided funding for projects promoting childbirth but not for projects promoting abortion as an 
alternative. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 529 (1958). 
 64. Id. at 519. 
 65. E.g., Rust, 500 U.S. at 193 (‘“[A] legislature’s decision not to subsidize the exercise of a 
fundamental right does not infringe the right.’” (quoting Regan, 461 U.S. at 549)); see also Harris v. 
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 n.19 (1980) (“A refusal to fund protected activity, without more, cannot be 
equated with the imposition of a ‘penalty’ on that activity.”). 
 66. Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez explained Rust v. Sullivan as standing for the 
proposition that the government is entitled to use its funds to convey its own message. Legal Servs. 
Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (citing Rust, 500 U.S. 173). When the government 
performs this action it is engaging in “government speech.” Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. 
Agency for Int’l Dev., 651 F.3d 218, 236 (2d Cir. 2011). “Government speech” is exempt from First 
Amendment scrutiny. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005). 
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C. Government Speech 
When the government itself “speaks” to further its own policies, 
the First Amendment’s ordinary limitations do not apply.67 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that when the government 
disburses funds through private entities to convey a particular policy, 
that too is government speech and is exempt from First Amendment 
scrutiny.68 Accordingly, classification of speech as “government 
speech” is often determinative of a regulation or condition’s 
constitutionality.69 Although the government cannot typically 
regulate speech on the basis of viewpoint,70 the Supreme Court has 
stated that viewpoint-based funding decisions are permissible when 
the government enlists private speakers to be a conduit for the 
government’s message or programs.71 One of the principal concerns 
when a private entity is required to espouse a governmental 
viewpoint is that the public will be unable to discern that the speech 
is not an entirely voluntary expression but is, in fact, required by the 
government as a condition of receiving a benefit.72 The larger public 
policy concern is that if the government can disguise its message as 
                                                                                                                                         
 67. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 553. 
 68. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 541. 
 69. E.g., Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009) (finding the placement of a 
Ten Commandments monument in a park did not violate the First Amendment because it was a form of 
government speech); Johanns, 544 U.S. at 562 (finding a regulation placing a tax on the sale of cattle to 
promote beef advertising was constitutional because the advertising was a form of government speech); 
Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 545 (finding that restriction prohibiting funding recipients from challenging 
existing welfare statutes was unconstitutional because program was designed to facilitate private speech 
not governmental speech). 
 70. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“Content-based regulations are 
presumptively invalid.”); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 
546 (1980) (“A regulation of speech that is motivated by nothing more than a desire to curtail 
expression of a particular point of view on controversial issues of general interest is the purest example 
of a ‘law abridging the freedom of speech . . . .’” (citing U.S. CONST. amend. I)). 
 71. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 541 (explaining Rust as having allowed a viewpoint-based funding 
decision because the government was transmitting its message through a private entity). 
 72. Elena Kagan, The Changing Faces of First Amendment Neutrality: R.A.V. v St. Paul, Rust v 
Sullivan, and the Problem of Content-Based Underinclusion, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 29, 55 (explaining that 
the public may give more credence to speech coming from private entities; if the government can 
disguise its message as that of a private organization, the risk exists that the government will be able to 
steer public discourse on issues). 
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being that of a private entity, the government can steer public 
discourse on controversial issues.73 
The Supreme Court has analyzed conditions on government 
funding and other similar conditions on numerous occasions.74 The 
majority of conditions on government funding simply restrict the 
purposes for which federal funds can be used.75 The Supreme Court 
has yet to consider a statute that requires an organization to take an 
affirmative ideological stance on a controversial issue as a condition 
of receiving funding.76 In Alliance and DKT, however, federal circuit 
courts (Second and D.C. Circuits, respectively) attacked the problems 
presented by affirmative expression requirements and the Leadership 
Act’s policy requirement in particular.77 The DKT court upheld the 
policy requirement, basing its decision principally on the government 
speech doctrine.78 The D.C. Circuit held that the policy requirement 
did not compel DKT to advocate for the government’s position; it 
only required that DKT communicate the government’s message if it 
wished to receive the Act’s funds.79 Because the court believed the 
requirement to be an instance of government speech, the court did not 
conduct a First Amendment analysis.80 The Alliance court, however, 
characterized the requirement as compelling recipients to espouse the 
government’s favored viewpoint.81 The Second Circuit elected to 
apply “heightened” or intermediate scrutiny and found that the 
                                                                                                                                         
 73. Id. 
 74. E.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) FCC v. 
League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984); Regan v. Taxation with Representation of 
Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). 
 75. E.g., Rust, 500 U.S. 173 (prohibiting use of federal funds to promote abortion as a method of 
family planning); League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (prohibiting broadcasting stations receiving 
federal funding from editorializing); Regan, 461 U.S. 540 (prohibiting recipients of a tax exemption 
from lobbying). 
 76. The majority in Alliance described the policy requirement as requiring funding recipients to 
“affirmatively oppose prostitution.” Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 
651 F.3d 218, 237 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 77. Alliance, 651 F.3d 218; DKT Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 477 F.3d 758 (D.C. Cir. 
2007). 
 78. DKT, 477 F.3d at 764. 
 79. Id. 
 80. The DKT majority stated that the policy requirement did not violate the First Amendment. Id. No 
level of scrutiny was used in their decision. Id. 
 81. Alliance, 651 F.3d at 234. 
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requirement could not pass constitutional muster under that 
standard.82 
Alliance and DKT demonstrate the inconsistent application of 
constitutional doctrine in the government subsidy context. Although 
the Supreme Court has analyzed numerous funding conditions that 
prohibit certain expression,83 the Court has yet to address the 
situation created by the Leadership Act’s policy requirement. The 
standard application of constitutional doctrine to restrictive 
conditions is insufficient to address the First Amendment concerns 
created by conditions requiring affirmative expression. Accordingly, 
existing constitutional doctrine must adapt to conditions requiring 
affirmative expression so that the principles protected by the First 
Amendment remain intact. 
II. CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE AS APPLIED TO 
GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES 
A. Conditions On Funding: Compulsory, Coercive, Or Simply A 
Choice? 
Whether a condition is “coercive” and thus unconstitutional 
depends, at least in part, on whether the potential recipient of the 
benefit is truly free to make a choice regarding acceptance of the 
benefit.84 Is the recipient able to make a wholly voluntary choice as 
                                                                                                                                         
 82. Id. The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s opinion applying heightened scrutiny. Id. 
The District Court did not believe strict scrutiny to be the appropriate standard of review because the 
policy requirement was “not a direct regulation on speech, but rather affect[ed] First Amendment 
freedoms indirectly.” Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 430 F. Supp. 2d 
222, 267 n.38 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 651 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 83. E.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (prohibiting use of federal funds to promote abortion 
as a method of family planning); FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984) 
(prohibiting broadcasting stations receiving federal funding from editorializing); Regan v. Taxation with 
Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (prohibiting recipients of a tax exemption from 
lobbying). 
 84. In Frost v. Railroad Commission of California, 271 U.S. 583 (1926), the Supreme Court struck 
down a regulation that conditioned the privilege of using a state’s highways on a private carrier’s 
submission to common carrier liability. Id. The Court stated that giving the carrier the option to forego a 
privilege vital to its livelihood or to submit to an “intolerable burden” was, in fact, no choice at all. Id. at 
593. In contrast, the court in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), upheld a regulation that 
conditioned the receipt of 5% of federal highway funds on a state’s adoption of a minimum drinking age 
of twenty-one. Id. at 205. The Court found that because the State only stood to lose 5% of funds by 
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to whether he should accept the benefit, or has the government 
created the condition such that, while the recipient is able to make a 
choice in the literal sense of the word, he must choose between 
complying with the condition or refusing to comply and suffering 
potentially drastic consequences?85 As Justice Sutherland asked in 
Frost v. Railroad Commission of California, has the potential 
recipient been given the choice “between the rock and the 
whirlpool”?86 Has Congress mildly encouraged compliance with a 
regulation or put “a gun to the [recipient’s] head”?87 If a condition 
provides the potential recipient with only the illusion of a choice, the 
government has impermissibly “coerced” the recipient into 
complying with the government’s regulations.88 The government 
cannot condition the receipt of a benefit that is so vital to an 
                                                                                                                                         
refusing to comply, the State had the option to make a choice whether it wanted to comply with the 
regulation. Id. at 211. Recently, in the landmark decision of National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), the Court held unconstitutional a provision of the 
Affordable Care Act conditioning states’ continued receipt of all Medicaid funding on an expansion of 
Medicaid coverage. Id. at 2571. The Court determined that the condition was impermissibly coercive, 
stating “Congress is not free to . . . penalize States that choose not to participate in that new program by 
taking away their existing Medicaid funding.” Id. at 2607. Chief Justice Roberts explained that, unlike 
the “relatively mild encouragement” in South Dakota v. Dole, the “financial inducement Congress 
employed here . . . is a ‘gun to the head.’” Id. at 2639–40. Roberts’s vivid description makes clear that 
the states had no choice but to accept the condition, thus the condition was an invalid use of 
Congressional spending power. 
 85. Compare South Dakota, 483 U.S. at 205 (analyzing a regulation that conditioned the receipt of 
5% of federal highway funds on a state’s adoption of a minimum drinking age of twenty-one), with 
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (analyzing a regulation that conditioned future receipt of all Medicaid 
funding, or up to 10% of a state’s overall budget, on that state’s expansion of Medicaid coverage). In 
Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc., v. Ragland, the Court analyzed a tax regulation exempting from sales 
tax certain publications, including newspapers and sports or religious journals. Ark. Writers’ Project, 
Inc., v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 224 (1987). Although the Court found the differential tax application 
unconstitutional, Justice Scalia argued that it was “implausible that the 4% sales tax, generally 
applicable to all sales in the State with the few enumerated exceptions, was meant to inhibit, or had the 
effect of inhibiting, [the] appellant’s publication.” Id. at 237 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Although Scalia did 
not say so expressly, he suggested that the tax exemption was not coercive because the publisher was 
left with a legitimate choice as to whether he should continue his publication—the tax was not 
prohibitive. See id. 
 86. Frost, 271 U.S. at 593. 
 87. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2604. 
 88. In United States v. Butler, the Court reviewed a regulation that conditioned the receipt of a 
subsidy on farmers reducing their crop production. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 54 (1936). The 
Court found the regulation impermissibly coerced compliance because the farmers could not afford to 
turn down the substantial financial benefit. Id. at 70–71. If the farmer refused to reduce production and 
declined the benefit, the farmer would not be able to competitively price his crops in comparison with 
those who received the subsidy. Id. The Court characterized the farmers “choice” as illusory. Id. at 71. 
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individual or organization’s well-being that the individual or 
organization must comply with the terms of the condition.89 Just as 
the government cannot use a direct regulation to compel a person to 
express certain speech,90 the government cannot indirectly force 
compliance where directly forcing compliance would be a violation 
of the Constitution.91 Certain conditions can “be so coercive as to 
pass the point ‘at which pressure turns into compulsion.’”92 
In addition to conditions that effectively eliminate the ability of a 
recipient to refuse compliance, conditions that “penalize” the 
exercise of a constitutional right can also be “coercive” and thus 
infringe constitutionally protected rights.93 The statute analyzed in 
Speiser is demonstrative of such a regulation.94 In Speiser, if an 
applicant chose not to sign the document containing the loyalty oath 
and thereby exercised his constitutional right to remain silent, the 
applicant would be “penalized” by losing a tax exemption.95 The 
Court stated that a regulation that denied a benefit on the basis of a 
person engaging in certain expression was tantamount to fining that 
expression—both indirect “penalties” and direct fines necessarily 
have a deterrent effect on the proscribed conduct.96 Speiser and other 
similar cases indicate that, at least in certain instances, acts of the 
government that have the effect of influencing an individual into 
waiving his constitutional rights are impermissible.97 
                                                                                                                                         
 89. E.g., id. at 70–71. In contrast to Butler, the South Dakota Court found that conditioning 5% of 
federal highway funds on the adoption of a drinking age of twenty-one was only “mild encouragement” 
and could not be considered coercive. South Dakota, 483 U.S. at 211–12. The conditioned benefit was 
not so substantial that it forced the state to comply with the regulation. Id. 
 90. The government cannot directly require a person to speak because such a regulation would be a 
violation of the First Amendment. E.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). In Wooley, the Court 
held that New Hampshire could not require that noncommercial vehicles bear a license plate embossed 
with the state motto. Id. at 717. The law in question subjected those who covered the motto to criminal 
fines and other sanctions. Id. at 708. 
 91. E.g., Butler, 297 U.S. at 70–71. 
 92. South Dakota, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)). 
 93. E.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958); see also Kagan, supra note 72, at 46 
(explaining that conditions that are labeled penalties are often considered “coercive” and 
unconstitutional). 
 94. Speiser, 357 U.S. 513. 
 95. Id. at 516–18. 
 96. Id. 
 97. In Sherbert v. Verner, the Supreme Court analyzed the application of a welfare regulation that 
denied a claimant unemployment benefits. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 400–01 (1963). The 
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Despite the apparent teachings of Speiser and its progeny, the 
Supreme Court has infrequently found conditions to be coercive 
when attached to government subsidies.98 In Regan, the Supreme 
Court analyzed a provision of the tax code that denied tax 
exemptions to charitable organizations that engaged in lobbying.99 
The Court rejected the argument that the condition was analogous to 
the condition imposed in Speiser, reasoning that unlike in Speiser 
where the tax exemption was denied because the individual chose to 
exercise his protected rights, Congress was not denying organizations 
a benefit because the organization chose to lobby.100 “Congress [had] 
merely refused to pay for the lobbying out of public monies.”101 By 
refusing to subsidize lobbying, Congress had not infringed the 
                                                                                                                                         
claimant was unemployed because she could only find a job that would require her to work on 
Saturdays, and she refused to work on Saturday—her Sabbath. Id. The Court found the regulation 
coercive and unconstitutional because it required the claimant to choose between exercising her 
constitutional right to practice her religion and foregoing a benefit or abandoning one of the precepts of 
her religion. Id. at 404. “Imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise 
of religion as would a fine.” Id. The Sherbert Court did not expressly say that the regulation “penalized” 
the exercise of religion, but it seems evident through the “fine” language that the reasoning was similar 
to the reasoning in Speiser. Id. 
 98. E.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 203 (1991) (upholding a regulation that provided federal 
funding to organizations provided the organization agreed not to use the funding to promote abortion as 
a method of family planning); Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 551 
(1983) (upholding a regulation that prohibited recipients of a tax exemption from lobbying); see also 
Sullivan, supra note 18, at 1431 (“The Court has been reluctant in practice to find that conditions on 
federal spending coerce recipients . . . .”). 
 99. Regan, 461 U.S. at 542. 
 100. Id. at 545–46. In upholding the condition, the Court focused heavily on the fact that the 
organization was not entirely prohibited from lobbying if they chose to accept the benefit. Id. 
Alternative channels remained available for the organization to continue to conduct lobbying activity. 
Id. at 544. If the organization wished to continue its lobbying activities, it could do so by creating an 
affiliate 501(c)(4) organization. Id. The organization would then be eligible for the tax exemption for its 
non-lobbying activities and could continue to lobby through its affiliate. Id. This opportunity seemingly 
strengthens the Court’s argument that, in enacting the regulation, Congress did not intend to discourage 
charitable organizations from lobbying—it simply chose not to pay for the lobbying activity. Id. at 545. 
Nevertheless, the opinion did not discuss the potential deterrent effect the condition would have on 
lobbying. Sullivan, supra note 18, at 1441. The Leadership Act contains a provision similar to the 
regulation analyzed in Regan that allows a recipient to create an affiliate organization that would not be 
required to adopt a policy explicitly opposing prostitution. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. 
Agency for Int’l Dev., 651 F.3d 218, 226 (2d Cir. 2011). Although this ability means organizations are 
not entirely prohibited from receiving funding if they advocate for prostitution, the condition would still 
have a deterrent effect on pro-prostitution speech. Id. As Speiser teaches, the Constitution frowns upon 
regulations that influence an individual or organization to waive their constitutionally protected rights. 
Speiser, 357 U.S. at 517. 
 101. Regan, 461 U.S. at 545. 
16
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 8
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol29/iss4/8
2013] CONDITIONS ON FEDERAL FUNDING 1145 
organization’s right to lobby.102 The law was not an impermissible 
“penalty” on the exercise of a right; it was simply a “nonsubsidy.”103 
The Court again used the nonsubsidy label in United States v. 
American Library Association, Inc. (American Library).104 In 
American Library, Congress passed a regulation that provided federal 
funding only to libraries that agreed to install internet filters designed 
to prohibit the viewing of obscene images.105 The Court held that 
Congress had not “penalized” those libraries that elected not to install 
filters to censor online content available to library patrons, it had 
simply refused to subsidize unfiltered Internet access.106 The Court, 
addressing the libraries’ freedom of choice, stated that any library 
that wished to provide unfiltered Internet access could do so and 
simply decline federal funding.107 
Two theories of what constitutes a “coercive” condition seem to 
arise from the case law.108 A condition is coercive if it substantially 
limits an actor’s ability to make an entirely voluntary choice or if it 
penalizes the exercise of a right and thus deters certain 
constitutionally protected conduct.109 It would be difficult to argue 
that the Leadership Act’s conditions eliminate a recipient’s ability to 
make a voluntary choice regarding acceptance of funding.110 
                                                                                                                                         
 102. Id. 
 103. Sullivan, supra note 18, at 1441 (explaining Regan v. Taxation with Representation of 
Washington as a case where the Court characterized the condition as a “nonsubsidy”). 
 104. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 211 (2003). The Court did not explicitly label 
the regulation as a “nonsubsidy” but reiterated that refusing to subsidize activity does not necessarily 
penalize that activity. Id. at 212. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. As discussed above, South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987), and United States v. 
Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 54 (1936), focus on the voluntariness of the choice possessed by the funding 
recipient. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958), and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 405 
(1963), focus on the deterrent effect of penalizing the exercise of a constitutional right. 
 109. Compare Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (declaring 
unconstitutional a provision of the Affordable Care Act that conditioned the receipt of all Medicaid 
funding on states’ expansion of Medicaid coverage), with Speiser, 357 U.S. at 518 (declaring regulation 
unconstitutionally coercive because it penalized the exercise of First Amendment rights). 
 110. None of the organizations that have challenged the constitutionality of the Leadership Act have 
been solely or principally reliant on Leadership Act funds for their operations. See Alliance for Open 
Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 651 F.3d 218, 224 (2d Cir. 2011); see also DKT Int’l, 
Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 477 F.3d 758, 760 (D.C. Cir. 2007). DKT International received only 
16% of its funds from USAID. DKT, 477 F.3d at 760. AOSI and Pathfinder both receive funding from 
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Regardless, however, of whether recipients are free to make a 
voluntary choice, the policy requirement will necessarily have a 
deterrent effect on the exercise of free speech.111 For example, both 
AOSI and Pathfinder were willing to sacrifice their constitutional 
right to speak out for the legalization or decriminalization of 
prostitution, as well as their right to remain silent on the issue, in 
order to receive funding.112 The Leadership Act acts as an incentive 
for organizations to sacrifice their constitutional rights.113 In this 
way, the Leadership Act can easily be analogized to the Speiser 
condition. Although there are some differences between the two 
conditions,114 both offer a government subsidy to encourage the 
waiver of constitutionally protected rights.115 Under Speiser, it seems 
that the Leadership Act could be labeled “coercive.” 
The case law also makes clear that a refusal to subsidize a right 
cannot be equated with the imposition of a penalty on the exercise of 
that right.116 There is a difference between “nonsubsidies” and 
                                                                                                                                         
sources other than USAID. Alliance, 651 F.3d at 224. Neither AOSI nor Pathfinder complained that 
Leadership Act funds were vital to their survival. Id. at 256. This does not mean that some organizations 
could not be solely reliant on Leadership Act funds. If an organization was heavily dependent on 
Leadership Act funds for its operations, it is possible the condition could be considered coercive under 
Butler. Butler, 297 U.S. at 70–71. 
 111. In an effort to remain eligible for Leadership Act funds, both AOSI and Pathfinder, prior to filing 
suit, adopted policies explicitly opposing prostitution. Alliance, 651 F.3d at 225. Adoption of policy 
statements with which the organizations disagree evinces the deterrent effect of the condition on the 
exercise of protected rights. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Prior to the implementation of the policy requirement, neither AOSI nor Pathfinder explicitly 
opposed prostitution. Id. at 224. However, neither organization actively supported prostitution. Id. at 
225. Both organizations worked closely with prostitutes and were engaged in advocating approaches for 
fighting HIV/AIDS among prostitutes. Id. at 224. AOSI and Pathfinder were hesitant to adopt such a 
policy for fear of alienating the prostitutes with whom the organizations were working. Id. at 236. 
However, both organizations still adopted policies opposing prostitution. Id. at 224. 
 114. In the Alliance dissent, Justice Straub drew a distinction between the Speiser condition, which he 
classified as an “already-existing benefit[],” and the Leadership Act, which did not deny organizations a 
subsidy to which they were otherwise entitled. Id. at 258 (Straub, J., dissenting). The veterans in Speiser 
were eligible for the tax exemption simply because they were veterans. Speiser, 357 U.S. at 514–15. If a 
veteran did not sign the loyalty oath, he would lose his entitlement to the tax exemption. Id. at 516. In 
contrast, recipients of the Leadership Act are only entitled to the subsidy if they choose to explicitly 
oppose prostitution. 22 U.S.C. § 7631(f) (2006). By remaining silent, the organizations are not losing a 
subsidy; they are just not receiving one. Alliance, 651 F.3d at 258 (Straub, J., dissenting). This 
distinction is related to the “baselines” discussed above. I focus on the deterrent effect of the conditions 
regardless of the baseline from which one measures. 
 115. See Speiser, 357 U.S. at 518–519; Alliance, 651 F.3d at 239. 
 116. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 n.19 (1980). 
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“penalties,” and mere “nonsubsidies” do not interfere with protected 
rights.117 Whether a regulation is labeled a penalty or a nonsubsidy, 
the condition can still have a deterrent effect.118 Because the 
Leadership Act does not deny an “already-existing benefit,” the 
Court would likely label the condition a permissible “nonsubsidy” 
rather than an impermissible “penalty” on the exercise of rights.119 
Simply labeling a condition a “nonsubsidy,” however, does not 
change the fact that the regulation will deter the exercise of protected 
rights. As Justice Stevens stated in his American Library dissent, 
“[a]n abridgment of speech by means of a threatened denial of 
benefits can be just as pernicious as an abridgment by means of a 
threatened penalty.”120 
B. It’s Not That We Don’t Support Abortion, We Just Don’t Want To 
Pay For It 
It is axiomatic in constitutional doctrine that the government 
cannot regulate speech based specifically on the viewpoint expressed 
because such a regulation would run counter to the goals of the First 
Amendment.121 “[I]t is the purpose of the First Amendment to 
preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will 
ultimately prevail . . . .”122 The reasoning for guarding free 
expression is to place decisions as to what views will be expressed in 
                                                                                                                                         
 117. According to the Court, a “penalty” can be coercive and have a deterrent effect on the exercise of 
rights; however, “coercion [is] conceptually impossible when government has merely declined to 
subsidize a right.” Sullivan, supra note 18, at 1439. 
 118. Courts often fail to analyze the deterrent effect of regulation on the exercise of constitutional 
rights, choosing instead to uphold “nonsubsidies” and strike down “penalties.” Sullivan, supra note 18, 
at 1420. 
 119. When dealing specifically with government subsidies, the Court has been hesitant to label 
conditions “penalties” and find them coercive. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991); 
Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983). 
 120. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 227 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 121. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (“[T]he First Amendment . . . does 
not countenance governmental control over the content of messages expressed by private individuals.”); 
Police Dept. of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means 
that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, 
or its content.”). 
 122. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984) (quoting Red Lion Broad. 
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)). 
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the hands of the public.123 If the government can burden or punish the 
expression of certain viewpoints, the government may use its power 
to effectively drive certain disfavored viewpoints from the 
marketplace of ideas.124 Because viewpoint-based regulations are so 
abhorred by the courts, strict scrutiny is applied to viewpoint-based 
funding decisions.125 In order to survive strict scrutiny, the 
viewpoint-based law must serve a compelling governmental interest 
and use the least restrictive means available to achieve that 
interest.126 In actuality, few laws meet the requirements to pass strict 
scrutiny.127 The strict scrutiny standard has been described as “strict 
in theory, fatal in fact.”128 
The prohibition on viewpoint-discriminatory regulations 
theoretically applies to conditions on government funding as well as 
to direct prohibitions on speech.129 The courts, however, can 
circumvent the prohibition by characterizing conditions as 
permissible selective funding decisions rather than impermissible 
viewpoint discrimination.130 By recasting a condition as a 
                                                                                                                                         
 123. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 
(1991) (quoting Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448–49 (1991)). 
 124. Connolly, supra note 47, at 134. 
 125. Id. at 135 (“Viewpoint-based regulation is generally considered to be the most disapproved 
category of speech regulation under the First Amendment, and approaches the standard of judicial 
scrutiny that is strict in theory, fatal in fact.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gerald 
Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal 
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972))). 
 126. Fallon, supra note 47, at 1268–69. 
 127. Connolly, supra note 47. 
 128. Gunther, supra note 125. 
 129. In Regan, the Supreme Court upheld a regulation prohibiting recipients of a tax exemption from 
lobbying. Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash. 461 U.S. 540, 551 (1983). However, the 
Court qualified its holding by stating that the outcome “would be different if Congress were to 
discriminate invidiously in its subsidies in such a way as to ‘aim[] at the suppression of dangerous 
ideas.’” Id. at 548 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958)). The Rust dissent argued that 
viewpoint discriminatory regulations could not be upheld just because the regulation was a funding 
condition. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 206–07 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The majority, 
however, found that the regulation was not viewpoint discrimination at all but just a decision to fund 
some activities to the exclusion of others. Id. at 193 (majority opinion). 
 130. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193. The Court explained: 
The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to 
encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same 
time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in another 
way. In so doing, the Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has 
merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other. 
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permissible, selective funding decision rather than a viewpoint-
discriminatory regulation, the Court can avoid applying strict 
scrutiny.131 
In determining whether a condition is viewpoint-discriminatory, 
the Court has drawn a distinction between regulations that are 
“intended to suppress . . . ideas” and regulations that simply limit the 
purposes for which funds can be used.132 In Rust, for example, the 
Court found that Congress’s intention was not to suppress pro-
abortion ideas but to limit the use of funds to family planning 
counseling.133 Establishing program limits, the majority reasoned, 
was not discriminating on the basis of viewpoint.134 Justice 
Blackmun strongly disagreed with the majority’s ruling in Rust.135 
Blackmun believed the regulation was clearly viewpoint-
discriminatory as it refused to fund “family-planning projects that 
advocate abortion because they advocate abortion . . . .”136 Blackmun 
believed that, regardless of the Court’s characterization of the 
condition,137 the regulation “plainly . . . targeted a particular 
viewpoint.”138 Accordingly, the dissenting justices would have 
applied strict scrutiny to the condition. 
                                                                                                                                         
Id. 
 131. The Rust Court did not apply strict scrutiny to the regulation that funded pro-life activities, but 
not abortion activities, because the Court determined that the regulation was not viewpoint 
discriminatory. Id. at 193. 
 132. E.g., Rust, 500 U.S. at 194; see also Regan, 461 U.S. at 548. 
 133. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193–95. The Rust Court believed that Congress intended to provide funds only 
for preventive family planning. Id. at 179. Funds were not to be used to provide prenatal care or advice. 
Id. Accordingly, the Court believed that Congress had not discriminated against abortion but had chosen 
to limit funds for use in preconceptional services. Id. at 193. Abortion did not fall under the 
Congressional definition of “family planning.” Id. at 179. 
 134. Id. at 194. 
 135. Id. at 207–15 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 136. Id. at 210. 
 137. Justice Blackmun was skeptical of the idea that Congress intended to provide funds only for 
preventive family planning counseling. Id. Blackmun stated, “the majority’s claim that the regulations 
merely limit a Title X project’s speech to preventive or preconceptional services rings hollow in light of 
the broad range of nonpreventive services that the regulations authorize Title X projects to provide.” Id. 
(citation omitted). The regulations allowed grantees to provide general health services, treatment for 
sexually transmitted diseases, etcetera. Id. at 210 n.2. None of these, Blackmun stated, “are strictly 
preventive, preconceptional services.” Id. 
 138. Id. at 210. 
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The Leadership Act can easily be analogized to the regulation 
analyzed in Rust—both regulations prohibit funding recipients from 
advocating for controversial practices.139 The Leadership Act, 
however, goes beyond the conditions imposed in Rust and requires 
funding recipients to affirmatively denounce prostitution.140 Any 
organization that refuses to denounce prostitution is ineligible for 
funds.141 The dissent in Alliance follows the Rust majority’s 
reasoning and states that, in promulgating the regulations, Congress 
did not intend to suppress pro-prostitution speech but to reduce 
HIV/AIDS behavioral risks by, in part, eradicating prostitution.142 
The dissent, quoting Rust, stated that Congress has the authority to 
“ensure that government funds are used for the purposes for which 
they were authorized.”143 
Although the Leadership Act may ensure appropriated funds are 
being used for their authorized purposes, in doing so, the Act 
necessarily discriminates on the basis of viewpoint. The Leadership 
Act only provides support to those organizations that agree with the 
government’s stance on prostitution or, at least, agree to affirmatively 
express that viewpoint.144 Viewpoint-based regulations, such as the 
Leadership Act—even if they are just conditions on funding—carry 
the risk that the government could, at least to a degree, drive certain 
viewpoints from the marketplace.145 The Leadership Act increases 
                                                                                                                                         
 139. 22 U.S.C. § 7631(e) (2006) (prohibiting recipients from advocating for the legalization of 
prostitution); 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (prohibiting funding recipients from providing counseling on 
abortion). 
 140. 22 U.S.C. § 7631(f). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 651 F.3d 218, 257 (2d Cir. 
2011) (Straub, J., dissenting). The majority believed the principal goal of the Leadership Act was to 
fight the spread of HIV/AIDS and not to eradicate prostitution. Id. at 237–38 (majority opinion). 
Consequently, the majority did not believe that Congress was simply ensuring that funds were being 
used for their authorized purpose. Id. 
 143. Id. at 248 (Straub, J., dissenting). 
 144. See § 7631(f). 
 145. Justice Blackmun argued in his dissent in Rust that ideologically based regulations should not be 
upheld just because they are conditions on funding and not direct regulations. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 
173, 211 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Blackmun believed that, by failing to consider the free 
speech interests of the petitioners and upholding a regulation aimed at the suppression of ideas, the 
majority failed to implement the protection the First Amendment provides for ideological messages. Id. 
at 214–15. Justice Blackmun’s reasoning could easily apply to an analysis of the Leadership Act. 
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the likelihood that organizations will adopt the government’s 
viewpoint on prostitution instead of offering their own or remaining 
silent on the issue altogether.146 If the Court continues to recast 
viewpoint-discriminatory regulations like the Leadership Act as 
permissible selective funding decisions subject to only minimal 
scrutiny, the government’s viewpoint will have a stronger presence in 
the marketplace in contravention of the goals of the First 
Amendment. 
C. Who Said That? 
The government speech doctrine exempts from First Amendment 
scrutiny instances where the government itself “speaks” or where the 
government conveys its own message by disbursing funds through 
private entities.147 In order to effectively govern, the government has 
to be able to promote its own policies, which, in some cases, will run 
contrary to the preferences of the citizenry.148 The government is not 
required to support the opposite side of an issue every time it takes an 
ideological stance.149 
1. Dangers of the “Government Speech” Doctrine 
The purpose of the First Amendment is to create an uninhibited 
marketplace of ideas in which the truth will prevail.150 The danger 
presented by the government speech doctrine is that the government, 
                                                                                                                                         
 146. The Leadership Act increases the likelihood that the organizations will adopt the government’s 
viewpoint by incentivizing the waiver of constitutionally protected rights. This is demonstrated by AOSI 
and Pathfinder’s adoption of anti-prostitution policies despite their disagreement with the viewpoint. 
Alliance, 651 F.3d at 224. 
 147. Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez explains that where the government itself “speaks” or where 
the government enlists private entities to convey its message, that message is considered “government 
speech.” Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541–42 (2001). “Government speech” is 
exempt from First Amendment scrutiny. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 559 (2005). 
 148. See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 574 (“To govern, government has to say something . . . .”); Bd. of 
Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000) (“It is inevitable that 
government will adopt and pursue programs and policies within its constitutional powers but which 
nevertheless are contrary to the profound beliefs and sincere convictions of some of its citizens.”). 
 149. Rust, 500 U.S. at 192. 
 150. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984) (citing Red Lion Broad. Co. 
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)). 
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free from First Amendment scrutiny, could use its considerable 
resources to push its favored viewpoint to the forefront of any 
debate.151 The government’s viewpoint could dominate the 
“marketplace of ideas.”152 When the government itself is speaking, 
the concern that the government’s viewpoint will dominate the public 
discourse is diminished because the public will be aware that the 
speech is coming from the government and will thus discount the 
viewpoint as biased.153 The same is true where it is made clear that a 
private entity is being required, as a condition on funding, to espouse 
the government’s viewpoint154: when it is clear that a private entity is 
espousing the government’s viewpoint and not its own, the public 
will be able to discount the value of that speech as if it were the 
government itself speaking.155 Problems arise where it is unclear who 
exactly is “speaking.”156 Is it the government? Is it the private entity 
itself, or is the private entity conveying the government’s message? If 
the origin of or reason for the speech is unclear, there is a risk that the 
public will lend more credibility to that expression than it would if it 
were aware that the speech was offered only as a means to an end.157 
In this way, the government could indirectly dominate the public 
discourse by concealing the origin of the speech.158 
                                                                                                                                         
 151. Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech is Both Private and Governmental, 83 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 610 (2008); Kagan, supra note 72, at 55. 
 152. See Kagan, supra note 72, at 55–56. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. Another reason that “government speech” is not subject to First Amendment scrutiny is that, 
if the public is aware that the government is the entity conveying the message, the public will be able to 
hold the government accountable through the electoral process. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 
544 U.S. 550, 571 (2005). Where the origin of the speech is disguised, “the resulting lack of 
transparency permits the government to advance its policy positions without being held accountable for 
its advocacy.” Corbin, supra note 151, at 610. Typically, “[d]emocracy . . . ensures that government is 
not untouchable when its speech rubs against the First Amendment interests of those who object to 
supporting it; if enough voters disagree with what government says, the next election will cancel the 
message.” Johanns, 544 U.S. at 575 (Souter, J., dissenting). However, where the electorate is oblivious 
as to the true identity of the speaker, it will be unable to hold the proper parties accountable for their 
message. 
 155. Kagan, supra note 72. 
 156. See id. 
 157. Id. at 55–56. 
 158. Corbin, supra note 151; see also Johanns, 544 U.S. at 579–80 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice 
Souter argued in his dissent that “expression that is not ostensibly governmental, which government is 
not required to embrace as publicly as it speaks, cannot constitute government speech . . . .” Id. at 580 
(emphasis added). In Johanns, the Court analyzed a program that required beef producers to submit a 
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2. Government Speech and the Leadership Act 
The Leadership Act requires recipients, if they wish to receive the 
Act’s funds, to adopt a policy of their own opposing prostitution.159 
Consequently, anyone who interacts or is familiar with organizations 
receiving Leadership Act funds will likely believe that those 
organizations oppose prostitution and are acting on their own 
initiative in adopting that policy. The policy requirement thus raises 
the concern that the public will not be able to discern that the 
statement was adopted only as a means of receiving necessary 
funding.160 Allowing the government to impose the policy 
requirement free from First Amendment scrutiny raises the risk that 
the government will be able to control the public discourse on the 
issue of prostitution. 
As the courts currently apply the concepts of coercion, viewpoint 
discrimination, and government speech, Congress can easily bypass 
normal constitutional limitations provided the regulation is only a 
funding condition and not a direct regulation.161 Conditions on 
funding, however, present many of the same First Amendment 
concerns as direct regulations or prohibitions.162 The current 
                                                                                                                                         
one dollar fee per head of cattle that would go towards beef advertising. Id. at 553 (majority opinion). 
Some beef producers objected on the grounds that the advertisements promoted beef as a generic 
commodity thus inhibiting their ability to promote the superiority of American beef, grain-fed beef, 
etcetera. Id. at 556. Many of the advertisements failed to indicate the messages were funded by a 
mandatory government fee but instead indicated that the advertisements were funded by “America’s 
Beef Producers.” Id. at 555. Justice Souter disagreed with the Court, which found the advertisements to 
be government speech, and claimed that a governmental message of concealed origin should not fall 
under the umbrella of government speech. Id. at 580 (Souter, J., dissenting). In line with Justice Souter’s 
dissent, the policy requirement, or any other government expression where the true speaker is concealed, 
should not be considered government speech. As in Johanns, there is no way for an independent 
observer to know that the anti-prostitution speech originates from the government. The government 
should not be able to use its wallet to force the hands of organizations while it hides behind the wall of 
the government speech doctrine. 
 159. 22 U.S.C. § 7631(f) (2006). 
 160. This assumes that the Leadership Act would not allow an organization to state that the United 
States government opposes prostitution or that it adopted the statement in order to receive federal 
funding. If the Act somehow made it clear that the statement was unequivocally the message of the 
government, the First Amendment concerns would be diminished. 
 161. Congress was, for example, able to discriminate on the basis of viewpoint where it otherwise 
would not be able to because the regulation was a funding condition. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 
207 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 162. For example, because the Leadership Act makes it unclear whether the private organization or 
the government is actually speaking, the First Amendment concern that the government may be able to 
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constitutional doctrine does not adequately protect expression in 
accordance with the goals of the First Amendment. 
III. PROTECTING THE INTEGRITY OF THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS 
THROUGH STRICT SCRUTINY 
In order to keep the marketplace of ideas free from government 
distortion and to ensure the realization of the goals of the First 
Amendment, the Supreme Court should alter its analysis when 
presented with a funding condition requiring affirmative expression 
of the government’s viewpoint.163 First, the Court should depart from 
the conventional but complicated and unworkable “coercion” 
analysis used to analyze the constitutionality of funding 
conditions.164 Instead, the Court should analyze each regulation 
independently, looking to see whether the regulation would 
potentially allow the government to distort the marketplace of ideas. 
Conditions, such as the one imposed by the Leadership Act, which 
require affirmative expression and conceal the origin of the 
message,165 undoubtedly allow the government to skew the public 
debate towards its favored viewpoint. When a regulation provides for 
such distortion, the Court should apply strict scrutiny. 
A. The Court Should Reject The “Coercion” Analysis And 
Determine—On A Case-By-Case Basis—Whether A Regulation 
Allows The Government To Distort The Marketplace Of Ideas 
When analyzing the constitutionality of government subsidies, the 
Supreme Court has continuously looked to whether the government 
is “penalizing” the exercise of a constitutional right or whether the 
government has simply refused to subsidize certain speech.166 If a 
                                                                                                                                         
steer the public discourse is present. 
 163. § 7631(f). 
 164. See supra text accompanying note 17. 
 165. See supra Part II. 
 166. Compare Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958) (explaining the condition on receipt of a 
tax exemption as penalizing the expression of speech), with Regan v. Taxation with Representation of 
Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 545–46 (1983) (explaining that refusing to subsidize First Amendment rights is 
not the same as “penaliz[ing]” the exercise of those rights). 
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condition acts as a penalty, it is coercive and unconstitutional.167 If 
the government, however, simply chooses not to subsidize certain 
activity, it has not “coerced” individuals or organizations into 
compliance.168 
The principal problem with this analysis is the Court’s failure to 
consider—independent of whether a regulation is technically 
coercive—the deterrent effect of speech-based regulations, such as 
the Leadership Act.169 Regardless of whether the regulation is a 
“penalty” or a “nonsubsidy,” regulations that withhold benefits from 
organizations that choose to fully exercise their constitutional rights 
necessarily deter the exercise of those rights.170 By offering benefits 
in exchange for the waiver of constitutional rights, the government is 
essentially allowing organizations to barter away their constitutional 
rights171—a practice that should not be permissible. If the 
government can incentivize the waiver of First Amendment rights, 
the government could eventually control the marketplace of ideas in 
contravention of the goals of the First Amendment.172 In order to 
avoid this occurrence, the Court should reject the “coercion” analysis 
and determine on a case-by-case basis whether a regulation provides 
                                                                                                                                         
 167. Kagan, supra note 72, at 56; Sullivan, supra note 18, at 1439. 
 168. Kagan, supra note 72, at 56; Sullivan, supra note 18, at 1439. 
 169. Kathleen Sullivan lamented the Court’s failure to conduct an analysis as to the deterrent effect of 
the regulation analyzed in Regan in her article, Unconstitutional Conditions. Sullivan, supra note 18, at 
1441. The Court simply considered the condition to be a refusal to subsidize rather than a penalty and 
thus applied minimal scrutiny. Id. In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun pointed to charitable 
organizations’ ability to lobby through affiliate organizations as a reason for upholding the regulation as 
constitutional. Regan, 461 U.S. at 553 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Blackmun states that Congress’s 
failure to completely prohibit an organization from lobbying is evidence Congress was not trying to 
suppress any ideas. Id. Although Blackmun did not explicitly refer to the deterrent effect of the 
regulation, he stated that the law would be unconstitutional if Congress were to prevent charitable 
organizations that received the tax exemption from lobbying altogether. Id. It could be inferred from the 
concurrence that, due to the loophole in the regulation, Blackmun believed organizations would not be 
seriously deterred from lobbying. Blackmun, however, failed to consider that regardless of the fact that 
an organization could continue to lobby, it might still be deterred from doing so due to the burden of 
creating an affiliate organization. 
 170. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 227 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 171. For example, in response to the Leadership Act, organizations, such as AOSI and Pathfinder, 
“traded away” their constitutional right to remain silent for the government’s subsidy. 
 172. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984) (citing Red Lion Broad. Co. 
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)); see also Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State 
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991) (quoting Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448–49 
(1991)). 
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the government with the ability to alter the public discourse on a 
certain issue. If the Court finds that the regulation would allow the 
government to skew the marketplace of ideas in its favor, it should 
apply strict scrutiny. If, on the other hand, the Court finds that a 
regulation would not allow the government to alter the public debate, 
minimal scrutiny or “rational basis” scrutiny should apply. 
B. The Court Should Apply Strict Scrutiny To The Leadership Act’s 
Policy Requirement And Other Similar Conditions 
The Leadership Act’s policy requirement undoubtedly warrants 
strict scrutiny application under the proposed analysis. Conditions 
requiring affirmative expression of the government’s ideological 
viewpoint arguably provide the greatest risk that the government will 
be able to alter the public discourse—certainly a greater risk than 
conditions that simply prohibit speech.173 When Congress, as it did in 
implementing Title X, restricts the use of funds to activities designed 
to promote childbirth as opposed to abortion-related activities,174 it 
may imply that the government does not support abortion as a 
method of family planning. However, no express anti-abortion 
message is being espoused.175 There is no explicit message or 
statement shared with the public and used to sway people’s thinking 
in one direction or another. This obviously is not the case with a 
condition requiring affirmative expression. If an organization is 
required to explicitly oppose prostitution, people may internalize that 
anti-prostitution message, and the public discourse on the issue may 
begin to favor the government’s viewpoint. Furthermore, the 
                                                                                                                                         
 173. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943) (finding that an 
“involuntary affirmation could be commanded only on even more immediate and urgent grounds than 
silence”). In Barnette, the state required schoolchildren to salute the flag and recite the pledge of 
allegiance or be expelled. Id. The Barnette regulation was not a condition on funding; however, it still 
represents that requiring affirmative expression is potentially more dangerous than prohibiting 
expression. 
 174. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (2006); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
 175. Funding recipients were not required to condemn abortion or state that they disagreed with the 
practice. If a client sought advice about abortion, the doctor or employee of the organization could 
simply say that “advice regarding abortion is simply beyond the scope of the program.” Rust, 500 U.S. 
at 200. 
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Leadership Act allows the government to conceal the origin of the 
anti-prostitution message.176 
Because conditions like the Leadership Act’s policy requirement 
(1) require the recipient to affirmatively express the government’s 
favored viewpoint and (2) do not make clear that the viewpoint is the 
government’s and not the private entity’s, strict scrutiny should 
apply.177 It is possible that application of a strict scrutiny standard to 
the policy requirement would invalidate the provision. The Court 
could find fighting the spread of HIV/AIDS to be a compelling 
governmental interest; however, it is unlikely the Court would find 
the policy requirement to be the “least restrictive means” of 
advancing that interest.178 
1. Strict Scrutiny Should Not Apply to Every Condition Requiring 
Affirmative Expression 
Every condition requiring affirmative expression, or even 
affirmative expression of the government’s viewpoint, should not be 
subject to strict scrutiny; only those that require a private entity to 
express the government’s viewpoint in such a manner that the 
viewpoint appears to be the entity’s own and not the government’s. 
Where the required expression does not espouse a particular 
                                                                                                                                         
 176. See supra Part II.C. 
 177. 22 U.S.C. § 7631(e)–(f); see also Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 237 
(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Although Justice Scalia disagreed with the Court’s application of strict 
scrutiny to the tax exemption at issue in Ragland, he suggested that more stringent tests may be 
appropriate (strict scrutiny for example) “when [a] subsidy pertains to the expression of a particular 
viewpoint on a matter of political concern—a tax exemption, for example, that is expressly available 
only to publications that take a particular point of view on a controversial issue of foreign policy.” Id. 
Essentially, the policy requirement mirrors this exact hypothetical. Subsidies are only available to those 
organizations that take a particular viewpoint on a controversial issue. 
 178. See supra Part II.B. Few laws actually meet the requirements necessary to pass strict scrutiny. 
Connolly, supra note 47. Given that the Supreme Court has yet to consider a condition similar to the 
Leadership Act, it is difficult to say for certain how the Court would decide the issue of compelling 
interest and least restrictive means. However, the District Court for the Southern District of New York 
found that the policy requirement could not pass intermediate or heightened scrutiny. Alliance for Open 
Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 430 F. Supp. 2d 222, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 651 
F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2011). The regulation was not “narrowly tailored” to promote the government’s 
interests. Id. at 269. The Second Circuit agreed with the District Court that the regulation could not 
survive heightened scrutiny. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 651 F.3d 
218, 234 (2d Cir. 2011). It could be inferred that a regulation that does not pass heightened scrutiny will 
probably not survive a strict scrutiny analysis. 
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viewpoint, there is little concern that public discourse on the issue 
would be distorted. For example, a regulation could require an 
organization to give directions regarding the government-sponsored 
program.179 A regulation that provided funding to organizations to 
give flu shots or vaccinations to the underprivileged could require the 
organization to inform the public that only people who meet certain 
qualifications will receive medication. If expression of a particular 
viewpoint is required, but it is clear that the viewpoint expressed is 
the government’s, the public will be able to view the expression with 
proper skepticism. The goal of the First Amendment to prevent the 
government from distorting the marketplace is not jeopardized in 
these situations. This is not the case with conditions like the policy 
requirement. 
2. Application of Strict Scrutiny Would Not Prevent Congress from 
Achieving Its Legislative Goals 
Assuming that application of strict scrutiny would invalidate the 
policy requirement or other similar regulations, Congress can still 
achieve its legislative goals; it will simply have to do so in a way that 
does not allow for the distortion of the marketplace of ideas. One of 
the ostensible goals of the Leadership Act is to prevent the spread of 
HIV/AIDS by reducing behavioral risks such as prostitution.180 
Congress hoped to reduce these behavioral risks in part by speaking 
out against prostitution and increasing awareness of the health risks 
created by such activity.181 Even if Congress cannot achieve its goals 
                                                                                                                                         
 179. Kathleen Sullivan suggests a similar analysis in Unconstitutional Conditions. Sullivan, supra 
note 18, at 1500. She proposes that where Congress passes legislation with the purpose of “pressuring 
rights,” as it did in passing the legislation analyzed in South Dakota v. Dole, strict scrutiny should apply. 
Id. at 1501. However, where Congress passes legislation that incidentally affects constitutional rights, 
minimal scrutiny should apply. Id. Sullivan uses a regulation that restricts the use of child support to 
expenditures on children as an example. Id. Although one could argue that such a restriction infringes 
the person’s constitutional right to privacy because it prevents the recipient from spending money on 
other items, it is clear that Congress’s purpose in passing the law was not to pressure constitutional 
rights. Id. Similarly, if a regulation required a funding recipient to affirmatively inform the public of a 
program’s parameters, Congress would not be “pressuring rights” or attempting to control the public 
discourse. Accordingly, strict scrutiny would not be necessary to protect First Amendment rights. 
 180. 22 U.S.C. § 7611(a)(4) (2006). 
 181. Id. § 7601(23). 
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through the policy requirement, other means remain available 
through which Congress could voice its opposition to prostitution. If 
Congress desires to speak out against prostitution, it could do so 
directly through government agencies as opposed to NGOs. If the 
government itself espoused anti-prostitution messages, there would 
be little concern that the government could distort the marketplace of 
ideas.182 Additionally, Congress could avoid the First Amendment 
problems raised by the policy requirement by altering the current 
terms of the condition. Instead of requiring the NGO itself to adopt a 
policy explicitly opposing prostitution, Congress could require the 
NGO to state that the United States Government explicitly opposes 
prostitution. Once again, this sort of statement would allow the 
government to speak out against prostitution while avoiding the risk 
that the public discourse might be altered in some way. Application 
of strict scrutiny to conditions like the policy requirement would 
prevent the government from dangling its purse in the eyes of 
financially strapped organizations in hopes of having them peddle the 
government’s favored viewpoints in the marketplace of ideas. 
CONCLUSION 
In its current form, the Leadership Act requires NGOs, as a 
condition of receiving federal funds, to adopt a policy explicitly 
opposing prostitution.183 Two federal circuit courts reviewed the 
regulation and arrived at different conclusions about the Act’s 
constitutionality.184 Each circuit court, however, based its decision on 
different aspects of the “unconstitutional conditions” and 
“government speech” doctrines.185 The courts’ diverging opinions are 
an expected product of an area of law that has been described as a 
“minefield to be traversed gingerly.”186 In addition to being generally 
                                                                                                                                         
 182. Kagan, supra note 72, at 55. 
 183. 22 U.S.C. § 7631(f). 
 184. See generally Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 651 F.3d 218 (2d 
Cir. 2011); DKT Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 477 F.3d 758 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 185. See Alliance, 651 F.3d at 231, 238; DKT, 477 F.3d at 763, 764. 
 186. Sullivan, supra note 18, at 1415. 
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confusing,187 the current doctrines applied to conditions on the 
receipt of government subsidies inadequately serve the goals of the 
First Amendment. The First Amendment is designed to create an 
“uninhibited marketplace of ideas” where the public—not the 
government—makes decisions as to what viewpoints will be 
expressed.188 By applying minimal scrutiny to viewpoint-
discriminatory regulations simply because the regulation is a funding 
condition and not a direct prohibition,189 the Supreme Court has 
effectively allowed Congress to do an “end-run” around First 
Amendment law. Presently, Congress can deter the expression of 
certain viewpoints as long as it does so through a funding 
condition.190 This allows the government to push its favored 
viewpoint to prominence while diminishing the existence of contrary 
opinions. 
In order to prevent the government from skewing the public debate 
in its favor, the Court should apply strict scrutiny to all funding 
conditions that require affirmative expression of the government’s 
ideological viewpoint and that fail to make clear the expression is the 
government’s rather than the private entity’s. Application of a strict 
scrutiny standard to regulations like the Leadership Act would not 
eliminate Congress’s ability to effectively promote its policies; it 
would simply require Congress to implement regulations that further 
policy objectives in a way that does not allow Congress to steer 
public discourse toward its favored viewpoint. 
Strict scrutiny analysis for conditions like the policy requirement 
strikes a proper and workable balance between the rights of 
organizations and the needs of government. Accordingly, the Court 
should apply strict scrutiny to the policy requirement and any other 
                                                                                                                                         
 187. Sunstein, supra note 18, at 594 (“The various puzzles produced by the [unconstitutional 
conditions] doctrine have created considerable doctrinal confusion and provoked a wide range of 
commentary.”). 
 188. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984) (citing Red Lion Broad. Co. 
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)); see also Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State 
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991) (quoting Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448–49 
(1991)). 
 189. See generally Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
 190. Id. at 207–08 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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condition that requires an organization to affirmatively espouse the 
government’s favored viewpoint as if it were the organization’s own. 
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